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Abstract
In the general context of smooth two-player games, this paper
shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent
conjectures in a given game and the evolutionary stability of these
conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and con-
sistent conjectures are the only interior candidates to be evolutionarily
stable. Examples are provided to illustrate the result.
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1 Introduction
Conjectures (or conjectural variations, CV) were introduced in the industrial
organization literature to provide a unified framework of imperfect compe-
tition, and in this capacity they are still used in empirical investigations
(Cabral, 2000, Ch. 9). However, from a theoretical point of view, conjec-
tural variations are considered to be problematic, as a good justification for
them is difficult to find in a static setting. For example, it was argued that
even consistent conjectures cannot be properly rationalized in such a case
(e.g. Lindh, 1992).
Figuieres et al. (2004) survey attempts to justify conjectural variations in
a dynamic setting. There are two main dynamic approaches. One considers a
repeated game setting with players behaving optimally to various degrees (see
e.g. Dockner, 1992; Friedman and Mezzetti, 2002; Jean-Marie and Tidball,
2006). The other approach considers evolutionary models of myopic play-
ers. With this approach, in the context of a linear-quadratic duopoly model
with differentiated goods, Mu¨ller and Normann (2005) showed that consis-
tent conjectures are evolutionarily stable, while Dixon and Somma (2003)
demonstrated in their model that an explicit evolutionary process converges
to consistent conjectures when goods are homogeneous.
In this paper I show that the consistency of (constant) conjectures and
their evolutionary stability are closely connected in the general setting of
smooth two-player games. Consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable
not only for linear-quadratic duopoly models, but also for other well-behaved
games. Thus this paper provides a rationale for consistent conjectures as
they emerge as a stable point of an evolutionary process in many situations.
The paper also provides a more convenient way to find stable points of the
evolutionary process as consistent conjectures are often easier to find.
The result is illustrated on a set of examples including games with quadra-
tic payoff functions, semi-public good games, and contest games. While the
first example is a straightforward generalization of the previously known
result, the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures in the other two
examples show how the general connection between the two notions works
in other situations.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Game
Consider a two-player game G = ({1, 2}, {X1, X2}, {u1, u2}), where X1, X2 ⊂
R are convex strategy spaces and u1(x1, x2), u2(x1, x2) are payoff functions of
the two players. In what follows, i refers to either Player 1 or Player 2, and
j to the other player (j 6= i). The payoff functions are assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable.
I consider the following variant of the conjectural variations (CV) model.
The players have (constant) conjectures about the marginal reaction of the
opponent to a marginal change in strategy. Let rij ∈ Yi ⊂ R, where Yi is
a convex set, be this conjecture of Player i about Player j, that is, Player i
believes that
dxj
dxi
(xi, xj) = rij ∀xi, xj .
I work with constant conjectures because they allow some selection; if con-
jectures depend on xi, xj then many strategy profiles can be supported by
(weakly) consistent conjectures (Laitner, 1980; Boyer and Moreaux, 1983).
Since Player i believes that xj depends on xi, Player i attempts to
maximize ui(xi, xj(xi)) on Xi. At an interior solution x
∗
i of this problem
∂ui/∂xi(x
∗
i , xj(x
∗
i ))+∂ui/∂xi(x
∗
i , xj(x
∗
i )) ·dxj/dxi = 0. Since the player does
not attempt to conjecture the whole reaction function xj(xi) but only its
slope dxj/dxi = rij , xj is an independent variable, so at x
∗
i it holds that
∂ui
∂xi
(x∗i , xj) + rij ·
∂ui
∂xj
(x∗i , xj) = 0.
When ∂ui/∂xj(x
∗
i , xj) 6= 0, then rij can be equated to a ratio of partial
derivatives:
Claim 1 At an interior best response x∗i of Player i
rij = −
∂ui/∂xi(x
∗
i , xj)
∂ui/∂xj(x∗i , xj)
, (1)
when ∂ui/∂xj(x
∗
i , xj) 6= 0.
3
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Condition 1 ∂ui/∂xj(x
∗
i , xj) 6= 0 for all xj and corresponding interior best
responses x∗i .
Condition 1 is a natural condition in a strategic setting, requiring that a
player’s payoff depends on the other player’s action (at the appropriate best
response). If this were not the case, the player would not need to care about
the other’s response, making conjectures unnecessary.
Let
Fi(xi, xj ; rij) :=
∂ui
∂xi
(xi, xj) + rij ·
∂ui
∂xj
(xi, xj).
At an interior solution x∗i of Player i’s maximization problem Fi(x
∗
i , xj ; rij) =
0. If the solution is unique and interior for each xj , Fi(xi, xj ; rij) = 0 im-
plicitly defines the reaction function x∗i (xj ; rij) of Player i. To be able to use
this reaction function I require
Condition 2 For all rij ∈ Yi, all xj ∈ Xj, the maximization problem of
Player i has a unique interior solution x∗i , for i = 1, 2.
The condition guarantees that the reaction functions of the players are
defined by the equations Fi(xi, xj; rij) = 0, Fj(xi, xj ; rji) = 0.
2.2 Consistent Conjectures
To distinguish the consistency notion I use from that in (some of) the liter-
ature (e.g. Bresnahan, 1981, where consistent conjectures are functions all
whose derivatives are required to coincide with the corresponding derivatives
of the actual reaction function in the neighborhood of equilibrium) I call a
conjecture of Player i weakly consistent if the conjectured reaction of Player
j equals the actual slope of the reaction function of Player j at best response,
i.e. rij = dx
∗
j/dxi(xi; rji) at x
∗
i .
When the reaction function is determined implicitly by Fj(xi, xj ; rji) = 0,
and ∂Fj/∂xj(xi, xj) 6= 0, the slope of the reaction function can be found from
the implicit function theorem. Therefore,
Claim 2 At the best responses (x∗i , x
∗
j ), conjecture rij is weakly consistent iff
rij =
dx∗j
dxi
(x∗i ; rji) = −
∂Fj/∂xi(x
∗
j , x
∗
i , rji)
∂Fj/∂xj(x∗j , x
∗
i ; rji)
, (2)
4
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when ∂Fj/∂xj(x
∗
i , x
∗
j ; rji) 6= 0.
Condition 3 ∂Fj/∂xj(x
∗
i , x
∗
j ; rji) 6= 0 for all rij ∈ Yi, rji ∈ Yj.
Condition 3 implies that the reaction function is continuous and differen-
tiable at the mutual best response point, and its slope is well defined. The
conjecture can then be compared with the slope.
Conjectures rCij , r
C
ji are mutually consistent if r
C
ij = dx
∗
j/dxi(x
∗
i ; r
C
ji) and
rCji = dx
∗
i /dxj(x
∗
j ; r
C
ij). When the game is symmetric, the reaction functions
are symmetric. Then a symmetric conjecture rC = rCij = r
C
ji is consistent
when rC = dx∗i /dxj(x
∗
j ; r
C).
2.3 The Evolutionary Stability of Conjectures
Suppose that conjectures are something players are born with (one can in-
terpret them as e.g. optimism/pessimism attitudes). Consider two large
populations of players who are repeatedly randomly matched. There is a
certain distribution of conjectures in the populations. In a match, players
either observe each other’s conjectures and behave according to an equilib-
rium of the game with these conjectures, or they learn to play an equilibrium,
where learning is (much) faster than the evolution of conjectures. In either
case, the (evolutionary) success of a given conjecture is determined by av-
eraging the equilibrium payoffs of the players endowed with this conjecture
over all matches. The proportions of players with given conjectures change
according to their evolutionary success.
For a conjecture rji of Player j, the evolutionarily stable (ES) conjecture of
Player i is a conjecture rESij such that no other conjecture rij performs better
or equally well in a population of Players i almost exclusively composed of
players with conjecture rESij (and the rest of the population has conjecture
rij). If in a monomorphic population of players with conjecture r
ES
ij a small
proportion of mutants with some other conjecture rij appears, evolutionary
forces will eliminate the mutants.
The informal description in the previous paragraphs corresponds to a gen-
eralization of the indirect evolution approach of Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) to
asymmetric games and multiple equilibria. More formally, let ui(rij , rji) =
5
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ui(x
∗
i (rij, rji), x
∗
j(rij, rji)) be the payoff of Player i when for each pair of con-
jectures rij , rji a particular equilibrium x
∗
i (rij, rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji) is played. For
a conjecture rji of Player j, conjecture r
ES
ij of Player i is evolutionarily stable
under equilibrium selection x∗i (rij, rji), x
∗
j (rij , rji) if ui(r
ES
ij , rji) > ui(rij, rji)
for any rij 6= r
ES
ij (asymmetric games ESS; Selten, 1980). A conjecture of
Player i is evolutionarily stable against a given conjecture rji of Player j if
it is the unique best response to this conjecture rji in the game with payoffs
ui(rij , rji).
If the solutions of their optimization problems are interior, x∗i , x
∗
j satisfy
Fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
j ; rij) = 0 and Fj(x
∗
i , x
∗
j ; rji) = 0. Consider the problem
max
xi,xj ,rij
ui(xi, xj) (3)
s.t. Fi(xi, xj ; rij) = 0
Fj(xi, xj ; rji) = 0
By the implicit function theorem, the system of equations Fi(xi, xj ; rij) = 0,
Fj(xi, xj; rji) = 0 determines locally functions x
∗
i (rij, rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji) when
∂Fi/∂xi · ∂Fj/∂xj − ∂Fi/∂xj · ∂Fj/∂xi 6= 0 at rij , rji, x
∗
i (rij , rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji).
Substituting the functions, problem (3) is equivalent to
max
rij
ui(x
∗
i (rij, rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji)) (4)
Problem (4) is exactly the problem of finding a best response conjecture for
Player i against the conjecture rji of Player j.
Since problems (3) and (4) are equivalent, they have the same solution.
At an interior solution of problem (3) the following first order conditions
hold:
∂ui
∂xi
+ λ
∂Fi
∂xi
+ µ
∂Fj
∂xi
= 0 (5a)
∂ui
∂xj
+ λ
∂Fi
∂xj
+ µ
∂Fj
∂xj
= 0 (5b)
∂ui
∂rij
+ λ
∂Fi
∂rij
+ µ
∂Fj
∂rij
= 0 (5c)
where λ, µ are Lagrangean multipliers. Since ui does not depend directly on
rij , ∂ui/∂rij = 0. Since Fj does not depend directly on rij , ∂Fj/∂rij = 0.
6
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Furthermore, since Fi = ∂ui/∂xi + rij · ∂ui/∂xj , ∂Fi/∂rij = ∂ui/∂xj . By
Condition 1 ∂ui/∂xj 6= 0, thus ∂Fi/∂rij 6= 0. From (5c) λ = 0 and from (5b)
µ 6= 0 and ∂Fj/∂xj 6= 0. Then (5a) and (5b) become ∂ui/∂xi+µ·∂Fj/∂xi = 0
and ∂ui/∂xj + µ · ∂Fj/∂xj = 0. Therefore,
Claim 3 At an interior solution of Problem (4)
∂ui/∂xi
∂ui/∂xj
=
∂Fj/∂xi
∂Fj/∂xj
. (6)
Condition 4 For all rij ∈ Yi, rji ∈ Yj, at rij, rji, x
∗
i (rij, rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji)
∂Fi
∂xi
∂Fj
∂xj
−
∂Fi
∂xj
∂Fj
∂xi
6= 0.
Condition 4 rules out degenerate cases such as when the reaction functions
are tangent to each other thus small changes in rij , rji may lead to a jump
to another equilibrium or to multiple neighboring equilibria, in which cases
functions x∗i (rij , rji), x
∗
j(rij , rji) would be discontinuous or ill-defined. The
condition makes sure that there is a smooth selection x∗i (rij , rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji)
from the set of equilibria as rij, rji vary in their respective Yi, Yj.
1
Using Claims 1 and 3, if an interior conjecture rij is evolutionarily stable,
then
rij = −
∂ui/∂xi
∂ui/∂xj
= −
∂Fj/∂xj
∂Fj/∂xi
.
By Claim 2 this means that rij is weakly consistent. Thus
Proposition 1 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior con-
jecture rij is evolutionarily stable against rji under some smooth equilibrium
selection x∗i (rij , rji), x
∗
j(rij , rji) then it is weakly consistent for this rji.
The proposition may also be stated as follows:
Corollary 1 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior conjec-
ture rij is not weakly consistent for rji, then it is not evolutionarily stable
against rji under any smooth equilibrium selection x
∗
i (rij, rji), x
∗
j(rij , rji).
1The problem of equilibrium selection disappears if there is a unique equilibrium for
all rij , rji. This will be the case in the examples in Section 3.
7
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For clarity, the statements are formulated using all four conditions dis-
cussed above. Not all of them are independent, and they are sufficient for the
statements but not all are necessary. Local versions of conditions may be suf-
ficient for the result; e.g. Condition 1 needs to hold only at the best response
corresponding to evolutionarily stable rij. From the proof of Claim 3, Condi-
tion 3 is implied by Conditions 1 and 2 at an interior evolutionarily stable rij,
thus a local version of Condition 3 is automatically satisfied. An equilibrium
selection may exist even when ∂Fi/∂xi · ∂Fj/∂xj − ∂Fi/∂xj · ∂Fj/∂xi = 0,
and not all best responses need to be interior. The present formulation is
chosen to avoid excessive technicalities, and in the examples in Section 3 the
conditions will be satisfied globally.
Additional assumptions are needed for the inference from consistency to
evolutionary stability. Condition 4 guarantees the existence of equilibrium
selection x∗i (rij, rji), x
∗
j(rij, rji). If sufficient conditions for a unique global
optimum of Problem (4) are satisfied, then the weak consistency of an inte-
rior conjecture r∗ij implies that r
∗
ij is an ES conjecture. One such sufficient
condition is the global concavity of the payoff function.
Proposition 2 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior con-
jecture r∗ij is weakly consistent for rji and [ui(x
∗
i (r, rji), x
∗
j(r, rji))]
′′
r < 0 for all
r, then r∗ij is evolutionarily stable against rji under the equilibrium selection
x∗i (rij , rji), x
∗
j(rij , rji).
Another condition, often easier to check, is local concavity together with
the uniqueness of the critical point. Thus
Proposition 3 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior con-
jecture r∗ij is weakly consistent, [ui(x
∗
i (r, rji), x
∗
j(r, rji))]
′
r = 0 has a unique
solution r∗ij, and [ui(x
∗
i (r, rji), x
∗
j(r, rji))]
′′
r |r=r∗ij < 0, then r
∗
ij is evolutionarily
stable under the equilibrium selection x∗i (rij, rji), x
∗
j (rij, rji).
The analysis above is for Player i and for a conjecture rji of Player j. A
similar analysis can be performed for Player j, keeping constant a conjecture
rij of Player i. Then if interior conjectures r
∗
ij, r
∗
ji are mutually evolutionarily
8
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stable, they are mutually consistent. If interior conjectures are not mutu-
ally consistent, then they are not mutually evolutionarily stable. Analogous
extensions hold for the other propositions.
When the game is symmetric, it is natural to expect players to hold
symmetric conjectures. In the symmetric case, the matching can be done
within one population since players’ roles are indistinguishable. Although
in this case evolutionary stability is not equivalent to strict best response
(strict best response implies evolutionary stability but not the reverse), the
propositions hold for the one-population symmetric case as well. An interior
evolutionarily stable conjecture is a best response to itself, so the first order
conditions have to hold, thus implying Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. Since
a strict symmetric equilibrium is evolutionarily stable in the one-population
symmetric case, sufficient conditions of Propositions 2 and 3 imply evolu-
tionary stability in this case too.
A graphical illustration of the close connection between consistency and
evolutionary stability is given in an example in the next section. Intuitively,
rji determines the reaction function of Player j. By varying rij, Player i can
change his own reaction function and so can change its point of intersection
with the reaction function of Player j. Player i will choose a point on the
reaction function of Player j where it is tangent to a level curve of Player
i’s payoff function. But since rij by Claim 1 equals the slope of this level
curve, best response rij has to be equal to the slope of the reaction function
of Player j, i.e. be consistent.
If conjecture rij is consistent, Player i ”knows” the reaction of Player j
to small changes in xi. Thus a player with consistent conjecture maximizes
the ”correct” function ui(xi, xj(xi)), and so has higher payoff than when the
conjecture is not consistent. Therefore the obtained result may look obvious.
Nevertheless, Mu¨ller and Normann (2005, p. 500) state that ”[...] the result
that the evolutionarily stable conjectures coincide with the consistent conjec-
tures is surprising as there is no obvious analogy between the two concepts.”
The result was also surprising for me. There was no reason to expect apriori
that ’more rationality’ (consistency) should lead to the same result as ’less
rationality’ (evolution); only after interpreting the result did the connection
appear obvious.
9
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3 Examples
3.1 Games with Quadratic Payoff Function
Consider the class of symmetric games with the payoff function given by
ui(xi, xj) = Axi +Bxixj − Cx
2
i ,
where A, B, C are parameters, A > 0, B 6= 0, C > 0, and C > |B|. Several
well-known games fall in this class, among which are the games for which the
evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures was analyzed in the literature.
For example, in the differentiated goods Cournot duopoly with linear
inverse demands Pi(qi, qj) = a− biqi − bjqj and quadratic costs Ci(qi) = cq
2
i ,
analyzed in Mu¨ller and Norman (2005) (and in Dixon and Somma, 2003, for
the homogenous goods case), a firm’s profit pii(qi, qj) = Pi(qi, qj)qi − Ci(qi)
can be represented as pii(qi, qj) = aqi − bjqiqj − (bi + c)q
2
i . A variant of
the search model in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) leads to payoff function
ui(xi, xj) = Axi + αxixj − cx
2
i , where the gains from trade Axi + αxixj
depend on the efforts xi, xj of the players and the cost of effort is cx
2
i .
Let the strategy space be X = [0, x), where x is a suitable upper bound
to make economic sense. There may be no upper bound (x = ∞). Let the
conjecture space be Y = (−1, 1).
Since ∂ui/∂xj = Bxi 6= 0 in the interior of X, Condition 1 is satisfied.
Player i’s problem is to maximize Axi + Bxixj − Cx
2
i , when dxj/dxi = rij.
The first order condition is
Fi = A+Bxj +Brijxi − 2Cxi = 0.
This implies x∗i = (A+Bxj)/(2C−Brij). If B > 0, then consider x =∞ for
x∗i to be interior. If B < 0, then x = −A/B guarantees that x
∗
i is interior.
Since ∂Fi/∂xi = Brij − 2C and ∂Fi/∂xj = B, the second order condition for
Player i’s maximization problem is ∂Fi/∂xi+rij ·∂Fi/∂xj = 2Brij−2C < 0.
Thus Condition 2 is satisfied and the reaction functions are given by Fi = 0,
Fj = 0.
Since ∂Fi/∂xi = Brij−2C 6= 0, Condition 3 is satisfied. Finally, consider
∂Fi/∂xi ·∂Fj/∂xj−∂Fi/∂xj ·∂Fj/∂xi = (Brij − 2C) (Brji − 2C)−B
2. Since
10
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C > |B| and rij , rji ∈ (−1, 1), then Brij − 2C < −C and Brji − 2C <
−C. Since the terms in the parentheses are negative, the right-hand side
expression is larger than (−C)(−C)− B2 > 0. Condition 4 is also satisfied.
The consistent symmetric conjecture can be found from
r = −
∂Fi/∂xj
∂Fi/∂xi
= −
B
Br − 2C
.
Then Br2−2Cr+B = 0. When B < 0, then there is one root on (−1, 1) and
it is between −1 and 0. When B > 0, then the root is between 0 and 1. In
any case, there is a unique consistent conjecture rC ∈ (−1, 1). By Corollary
1 it is the unique interior candidate for an evolutionarily stable conjecture.
The payoff function can be written as ui(xi, xj) = x
2
i ((A+Bxj)/xi − C).
From the reaction functions, A + Bx∗j = (2C − Brij)x
∗
i . Therefore, at equi-
librium ∂ui/∂rij = −B (x
∗
i )
2 + 2x∗i (C −Brij) · ∂x
∗
i /∂rij .
The equilibrium strategy of Player i is
x∗i =
A(B − (Brji − 2C))
(Brij − 2C) (Brji − 2C)− B2
.
Then ∂x∗i /∂rij = (−B (Brji − 2C)x
∗
i )/((Brij − 2C) (Brji − 2C)− B
2), and
∂ui
∂rij
=
B2 (x∗i )
2
(Brij − 2C) (Brji − 2C)− B2
(B − rij(2C − Brji)).
The unique solution of ∂ui/∂rij = 0 is rij = −B/(Brji−2C). When rji = r
C ,
the unique solution is rij = r
C .
Furthermore,
∂2ui
∂r2ij
= B2 (x∗i )
2 Brji − 2C
(Brij − 2C) (Brji − 2C)− B2
at rij = rji = r
C . The denominator of this expression is positive, and the
numerator is negative, for all rij , rji ∈ (−1, 1). Thus ∂
2ui/∂r
2
ij < 0 and by
Proposition 3
Proposition 4 In the games with a quadratic payoff function analyzed in
this section, there exists a unique consistent conjecture and it is the unique
evolutionarily stable one.
11
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To get the intuition behind the result, also for the general case of the
previous section, consider Figure 1.
[Figure 1 around here]
Conjecture r21 determines a reaction function of Player 2, which is linear and
decreasing when B < 0. Varying r12 varies the reaction function of Player 1.
Three of these reaction functions are drawn in the figure. The equilibrium is
on the intersection of the reaction functions, thus varying r12 allows Player
1 to move along the given reaction function of Player 2. Some payoff level
curves of Player 1 are also drawn in the figure. Payoff is increasing in the
south-east direction.
Since Player 1 can vary the equilibrium point by moving along the reaction
function of Player 2, the best payoff Player 1 can achieve in equilibrium is at
the point where a level curve is tangent to the reaction function of Player 2.
At this point the slope of the reaction function equals the slope of the payoff
level curve. For Player 1, having a conjecture r12 means that the reaction
function of Player 1 cuts the level curves at points where their slope equals
r12 (by Claim 1). Therefore, conjecture r12 equals the slope of the payoff
level curves at the points of intersection with the corresponding reaction
function of Player 1. At the best equilibrium for Player 1, a level curve
and the reaction function of Player 2 are tangent and so evolutionary stable
conjecture r12 is equal to the slope of the reaction function of Player 2, which
means that r12 is consistent.
3.2 Semi-Public Good Games
Consider the following symmetric two player public good provision game.
Players have endowments w of private good. They can contribute xi to the
public good, and leave yi = w− xi of private good for consumption. Let the
strategy set be X = [−w,w], which is needed to guarantee an interior best
response and can be interpreted as opportunities to contribute as well as to
take out of a common pool of public good. The contribution of Player j enters
Player i’s utility with weight β ∈ (0, 1), thus for Player i the total supply
of public good is Xi = xi + βxj . Players’ utility functions are ui(yi, Xi).
12
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This is the model of semi-public goods considered in Costrell (1991). Let
Y = (−1, 1).
Suppose that the utility functions are ui(yi, Xi) = y
α
i X
1−α
i , where 0 <
α < 1.2 The payoff function of Player i is then
ui(xi, xj) = (w − xi)
α(xi + βxj)
1−α.
For a conjecture rij, the first order condition of the maximization problem
of Player i is
Fi = −α
(
Xi
yi
)1−α
+ (1− α)
(
yi
Xi
)α
(1 + βrij) = 0.
Let vi = Xi/yi. Then the first order condition implies that vi = (1+βrij)(1−
α)/α. This means that xi + βxj = (1 + βrij)(w − xi)(1− α)/α, or that
x∗i =
(1− α)(1 + βrij)
1 + (1− α)βrij
w −
αβ
1 + (1− α)βrij
xj .
This x∗i is unique and interior for all xj ∈ [−w,w]. Note also that X
∗
i =
x∗i + βxj = (1 + βrij)(w − x
∗
i )(1 − α)/α > 0 and y
∗
i = w − x
∗
i > 0 at the
interior best response.
Because
∂Fi
∂xi
= −α(1− α)(yi +Xi)
((
Xi
yi
)
−α
1
y2i
+
(
yi
Xi
)α−1
1
X2i
(1 + βrij)
)
∂Fi
∂xj
= −α(1− α)βyi
((
Xi
yi
)
−α
1
y2i
+
(
yi
Xi
)α−1
1
X2i
(1 + βrij)
)
,
it holds that ∂Fi/∂xi + rij · ∂Fi/∂xj = −α(1 − α)(Xi + yi(1 + βrij))(v
−α
i ·
1/y2i + v
1−α
i (1 + βrij)/X
2
i ) < 0 at x
∗
i , since Xi > 0, yi > 0, and 1 + βrij > 0
when rij ∈ (−1, 1). This means that Condition 2 is fulfilled, and reaction
functions are given by Fi = 0, Fj = 0.
From the reaction function, with a consistent symmetric conjecture
r =
dx∗i
dxj
= −
βα
1 + (1− α)βr
,
2To cover the possibility of a negative Xi, which does not arise in equilibrium, assume
ui(yi, Xi) = 0 if Xi < 0.
13
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implying (1−α)βr2+r+αβ = 0. For r ∈ (−1, 1), there is one root rC of this
equation, and it is between −1 and 0. The consistent conjecture is negative,
as obtained in Costrell (1991) for a more general semi-public good setup.
It holds that ∂ui/∂xj = (1 − α)β (yi/Xi)
α 6= 0 in the interior of X, as
required by Condition 1. Also ∂Fi/∂xi 6= 0 in equilibrium, thus Condition 3
is fulfilled. Finally, for Condition 4 ∂Fi/∂xi · ∂Fj/∂xj − ∂Fi/∂xj · ∂Fj/∂xi =
α2(1− α)2(Xi + (1 + βrij)yi)(Xj + (1 + βrji)yj)(XiXj +Xiyj + yiXj + (1−
β2)yiyj)/((XiXj)
α+1(yiyj)
2−α) 6= 0. By Corollary 1 the consistent conjecture
is the unique interior candidate for an evolutionarily stable conjecture.
Since in equilibrium X∗i = (1+ βrij)y
∗
i (1− α)/α, the utility function can
be written as ui(rij , rji) = (1 + βrij)
1−αy∗i ((1− α)/α)
1−α. Then ∂ui/∂rij =
((1− α)/α)1−α (1 + βrij)
−α ((1− α)βy∗i + (1 + βrij)∂y
∗
i /∂rij). The equilib-
rium strategy of Player i is
x∗i =
(1− α) ((1 + βrij)(1 + (1− α)βrji)− (1 + βrji)αβ)
(1 + (1− α)βrij)(1 + (1− α)βrji)− α2β
2
w.
It holds that ∂y∗i /∂rij = −∂x
∗
i /∂rij = −(β(1− α)(1 + (1− α)βrji))y
∗
i /((1 +
(1− α)βrij)(1 + (1− α)βrji)− α
2β2). Then
∂ui
∂rij
= −
(
1− α
α
)1−α
(1 + βrij)
−α(1− α)αβ2y∗i (rij(1 + (1− α)βrji) + αβ)
(1 + (1− α)βrij)(1 + (1− α)βrji)− α2β
2
.
The first order maximization condition ∂ui/∂rij = 0 has the unique solution
rij = −αβ/(1 + (1− α)βrji). When rji = r
C , then the solution is rij = r
C ∈
(−1, 0).
Let K = − ((1− α)/α)1−α (1 − α)β2α < 0. For the second order condi-
tion,
∂2ui
∂r2ij
= K(1 + βrij)
−αy∗i
1 + (1− α)βrC
(1 + (1− α)βrC)2 − α2β2
at rij = rji = r
C . The sign of ∂2ui/∂r
2
ij is determined by the signs of 1+(1−
α)βrC and (1+(1−α)βrC)2−α2β2. Since 1+(1−α)βrC = −βα/rC , 1+(1−
α)βrC > 0 and (1+(1−α)βrC)2−α2β2 = α2β2
(
1/(rC)2 − 1
)
> 0. Therefore
∂2ui/∂r
2
ij < 0, and the consistent conjecture r
C is also evolutionarily stable.
Proposition 5 In the semi-public good games of this section the unique con-
sistent conjecture rC is the unique evolutionarily stable conjecture.
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3.3 Rent-seeking games
Consider the following symmetric game, presented as a rent-seeking contest
first in Tullock (1980). Two players compete for a prize of value V by making
investments xi. The probability that a player wins the prize is xi/(xi + xj).
The cost of an investment is simply xi. The (expected) payoff of Player i is
ui(xi, xj) =
xi
xi + xj
V − xi.
To avoid technical difficulties that do not influence the result, consider in-
vestments strictly between 0 and V , i.e. X = (0, V ). Let also Y = (−1, 1).
Since ∂ui/∂xj = −xiV/(xi + xj)
2, Condition 1 is satisfied in the interior
of X. Note also that ∂ui/∂xi = xjV/(xi + xj)
2 − 1.
The first order condition of Player i’s optimization problem is
Fi =
xj − rijxi
(xi + xj)2
V − 1 = 0.
The solution of this equation satisfies (xj − rijxi)V = (xi + xj)
2. When
xi = 0, then the left-hand side xjV is larger than the right-hand side x
2
j .
When xi = V , then the left-hand side (xj − rijV )V is smaller than the
right-hand side (V + xj)
2. Since the equation is quadratic, there is a unique
solution of the first order condition equation on (0, V ) for any rij ∈ (−1, 1)
and xj ∈ (0, V ).
It holds that ∂Fi/∂xi = V (−rij(xi + xj) − 2(xj − rijxi))/(xi + xj)
3 and
∂Fi/∂xj = V ((xi+xj)− 2(xj− rijxi))/(xi+xj)
3. At the solution of the first
order condition equation
∂Fi
∂xi
=
1
(xi + xj)2
(−rijV − 2(xi + xj))
∂Fi
∂xj
=
1
(xi + xj)2
(V − 2(xi + xj)).
Then ∂Fi/∂xi + rij · ∂Fi/∂xj = −2(1 + rij)/(xi + xj) < 0. Thus locally the
second order condition of Player i’s optimization problem is satisfied, and
the best response is found from Fi = 0, that is, Condition 2 is satisfied.
When ∂Fi/∂xi = 0 at the solution of the first order condition equation,
then xi + xj = −V rij/2, or rijxi = −V rij/2 − rijxj . From the first order
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condition rijxi = xj − V r
2
ij/4. This implies (rij + 1)xj = −V r
2
ij/4. However,
this can hold only when xj < 0, thus ∂Fi/∂xi = 0 and Fi = 0 are incompatible
on (0, V ). Therefore Condition 3 holds.
At the solution of the first order condition equations for the two players
∂Fi/∂xi ·∂Fj/∂xj−∂Fi/∂xj ·∂Fj/∂xi = V ((rijrji−1)V +2(rji+rij+2)(xi+
xj))/(xi + xj)
4. Adding up the first order condition (xj − rijxi)V/(xi +
xj)
2 − 1 = 0 for Player i multiplied by rji and the first order condition
(xi − rjixj)V/(xi + xj)
2 − 1 = 0 for Player j gives xi(1 − rjirij)V/(xi +
xj)
2− rij−1 = 0. Doing the analogous operation interchanging players gives
xj(1−rijrji)V/(xi+xj)
2−1−rij = 0. Adding up, (1−rijrji)V/(xi+xj)−2−
rij − rij = 0. Thus xi + xj = (1− rijrji)V/(2 + rij + rij) in equilibrium. But
then (rijrji − 1)V + 2(xi + xj)(rji + rij + 2) = (1− rijrji)V > 0. Therefore
Condition 4 is satisfied.
In equilibrium, the slope of the reaction function is
dx∗i
dxj
= −
∂Fi/∂xj
∂Fi/∂xi
= −
V − 2(xi + xj)
−V rij − 2(xi + xj)
.
With symmetric conjectures rij = rji = r, the equilibrium x
∗
i = x
∗
j = x is
symmetric, thus for a consistent symmetric conjecture r = −(V −4x)/(−V r−
4x). In symmetric equilibrium x = (1 − r)V/4. Then for a conjecture r to
be consistent, r = −(V − (1 − r)V )/(−V r − (1 − r)V ) = r. That is, every
r ∈ (−1, 1) is a symmetric consistent conjecture. This conforms to the result
of Michaels (1989) who obtains that every r is a consistent conjecture for
more general symmetric contests.
The equilibrium strategies of the players are
x∗i =
(1− rijrji) (1 + rji)
(2 + rij + rij)
2
V and x∗j =
(1− rijrji) (1 + rij)
(2 + rij + rij)
2
V .
To maximize the fitness function ui(rij, rji) at x
∗
i , x
∗
j find ∂ui/∂rij = V ((xjV−
(xi+xj)
2)(−3r2ji−r
3
ji−2+rijrji−4rji+r
2
jirij)+(−xi)V (−rji−3rijrji−r
2
ji−
2rijr
2
ji − rij))/((xi + xj)
2(2 + rij + rji)
3). Since in equilibrium (xi + xj)
2 =
(xj − rijxi)V ,
∂ui
∂rij
=
xi
(xi + xj)2
V 2(1 + rji)
(2 + rij + rji)
3
(r2ijrji − rij(r
2
ji + 1) + rji).
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Solving r2ijrji− rij(r
2
ji+1)+ rji = 0 gives rij = rji and rij = 1/rji. The latter
solution is not admissible since rij, rji ∈ (−1, 1).
For each rji ∈ (−1, 1) there is a unique solution rij = rji of the first order
condition within the (−1, 1) interval. The second order condition is
∂2ui
∂r2ij
= V 2(1 + r)
xi
(xi + xj)2
(r2 − 1) (2 + 2r)
(2 + 2r)4
< 0,
at rji = rij = r. By Proposition 3 this means that all r are evolutionarily
stable.
Proposition 6 In the rent-seeking game of this section, all conjectures r ∈
(−1, 1) are consistent and evolutionarily stable.
4 Conclusion
It is shown that the observations of Mu¨ller and Normann (2005) and Dixon
and Somma (2003) about the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures
for a particular duopoly case extend to other games because they are based
on the coincidence of the first order conditions. Apart from the examples
considered in this paper, other games to which the results can be applied
include common pool resource exploitation games and differentiated product
Bertrand duopoly. It should be possible to generalize the results to n-player
aggregative games, i.e. games in which payoffs depend on own strategy and
on an aggregate of strategies of the other players. In such games a conjecture
can be treated as the conjecture about the aggregate reaction of the other
players.
The intuition for the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures is
that a player with such a conjecture correctly estimates the response of the
other player and thus maximizes the ”right” function, outperforming in evolu-
tionary terms players with other conjectures. Though this result may appear
obvious ex-post, it was not so before the analysis. It is interesting that ’more
rational’ (consistency) and ’less rational’ (evolution) approaches lead to the
same outcome in many games.
The contribution of the paper can be seen as twofold. The evolutionary
approach can provide a justification for consistent conjectures as emerging
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from a dynamic process, and the paper shows that this justification holds for
many situations. On the other hand, consistent conjectures are often easier
to find, simplifying the evolutionary analysis. Depending on the questions
asked about a game, one or the other approach can be used, since the two
approaches complement each other.
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